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Abstract. When we teach physics to prospective scientists and engineers we are teaching more than the "facts" of phys-
ics – more, even, than the methods and concepts of physics. We are introducing them to a complex culture - a mode of 
thinking and the cultural code of behavior of a community of practicing scientists. This culture has components that are 
often part of our hidden curriculum: epistemology - how we decide that we know something; ontology - how we parse 
the observable world into categories, objects, and concepts; and discourse - how we hold a conversation in order to gen-
erate new knowledge and understanding. Underlying all of this is intuition – a culturally created sense of meaning. To 
explicitly identify teach our hidden curriculum we must pay attention to students' intuition and perception of physics, not 
just to their reasoning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Learning a complex field of knowledge such as phys-
ics is a more complex process than we often give it 
credit for – because it is so natural to us. Even though 
we may have spent more than twenty years in school 
and many more learning to be experts, we have a 
strong tendency not to think explicitly about learning. 
Rather, we have “phenomenological primitives (p-
prims)” of learning and folk psychology. But to under-
stand our students and their difficulties in mastering 
physics, we have to get beyond our p-prims about their 
thinking and do the science of understanding their 
thinking processes. 
Typically, when we prepare our syllabi, we select 
the content we intend to “cover”. But what we really 
want our students to learn is more than just a set of 
facts: it’s a way of thinking – the manner and “adap-
tive expertise” of the professional. The “hidden cur-
riculum” is made up of those elements that are a part 
of learning our subject that we expect our students to 
learn without our being explicit about them – the items 
that are supposed to “come along for the ride”.  
In order to go deeper than just “that-looks-good-
to-me!” heuristics, we have to do some deep thinking 
about the nature of professionalism in physics. We 
need to develop insight into how the culture of physics 
affects our cognitive processing and our thinking about 
the physical world. Some issues have been explicitly 
studied by the PER community, for example: 
• Epistemology – What is accepted as evidence 
for believing a particular result? [1]  
• Ontology – What kind of “things” do we talk 
about and what is their nature? [2] 
But there are others that I think we need to be more 
explicit about. One that we often ignore is intuition. In 
order to consider this element, let’s think deeply about 
both how people think in general and how profession-
als think.  We’ll look at the hidden curriculum through 
two lenses: the cognitive and the socio-cultural. 
THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM 
THROUGH A COGNITIVE LENS 
Since we tend to learn without thinking about it explic-
itly, we need to deconstruct expert thinking. [3] This 
helps us make sense both of why the hidden curricu-
lum is hidden and what elements we need to begin 
paying attention to. 
Why the Hidden Curriculum is Hidden 
Learning involves a number of cognitive develop-
ments: building links and associations, compiling as-
sociated elements into chunks that can be used as sin-
gle elements in working memory (and opened up when 
needed), and developing framings – learning when 
particular bits of knowledge and activities are relevant. 
These items are discussed in a number of papers (see 
[4], section 4 and refs. therein). They help explain why 
things that seem trivial to an expert may be difficult 
for a student and why the process of developing exper-
tise remains “hidden”. A critical element in under-
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standing both of these issues is intuition. Its cognitive 
content is suggested by two parables. 
Two Parables of Achilles 
The first parable comes from a book on the subject 
of cognitive linguistics. [5] In this book, Gilles Fau-
connier and Mark Turner consider how we make 
meaning of language and the detailed ways in which 
we construct new ways of thinking out of old. They 
are not trying to make sense of the formal elements of 
language, but rather of what goes on invisibly “under 
the hood”. Here is a selection from their preamble. 
We live in the age of the triumph of form. In 
mathematics, physics, music, the arts, and the so-
cial sciences, human knowledge and its progress 
seem to have been reduced in startling and pow-
erful ways to a matter of essential formal struc-
tures and their transformations…. The axiomatic 
method rules, not only in mathematics but also in 
economics, linguistics, sometimes even music. 
On the other hand, common sense tells us that 
form is not substance: The blueprint is not the 
house, the recipe is not the dish, the computer 
simulation of weather does not rain on us. When 
Patroclos donned the armor of Achilles to battle 
the Trojans, what the Trojans first saw was the 
spectacular armor, and they naturally assumed it 
was Achilles, and were terrified, and so the ar-
mor by itself looked as if it was turning the battle. 
But it didn't take long for the Trojans to discover 
that it was just Achilles's armor, not Achilles 
himself, and then they had no pity.… Clearly the 
miracles accomplished by the armor depend on 
the invisible warrior inside. [5]  
Fauconnier and Turner go on to flesh out the Achilles 
metaphor. Our formal linear reasoning is like the ar-
mor – powerful and enhancing; but without the “inner 
Achilles” – our parallel processing “recognition soft-
ware” – the formal reasoning is useless. Some psy-
chologists work very hard to try to build computa-
tional models of recognition, but do not yet seem to be 
able to help us at the phenomenological level. For 
now, I suggest we need to think of “intuition” as some-
thing distinct from formal reasoning but enabling it. 
This point is strengthened further by a second par-
able of Achilles, Lewis Carroll’s “What the Tortoise 
Said to Achilles”.  In it the tortoise undermines Achil-
les’ application of formal logic. Here’s an excerpt. [6] 
Tortoise: “Well, now, let's take a little bit of the 
argument in that First Proposition -- just two 
steps, and the conclusion drawn from them. 
Kindly enter them in your notebook. And in or-
der to refer to them conveniently, let's call them 
A, B, and Z: --  
(A) Things that are equal to the same  
      are equal to each other.  
(B) The two sides of this Triangle are things  
      that are equal to the same.  
(Z) The two sides of this Triangle are  
      equal to each other.  
T: Readers of Euclid will grant, I suppose, that Z 
follows logically from A and B, so that any one 
who accepts A and B as true, must accept Z as 
true?”  
Achilles: “Undoubtedly! The youngest child in a 
High School -- as soon as High Schools are in-
vented, which will not be till some two thou-
sand years later -- will grant that.” 
T: “And might there not also be some reader who 
would say 'I accept A and B as true, but I don't 
accept the Hypothetical ' [i.e., proposition Z]?”  
A: “Certainly there might. He, also, had better take 
to football.”  
T: “And neither of these readers,” the Tortoise con-
tinued, “is as yet under any logical necessity to 
accept Z as true?”  
A: “Quite so,” Achilles assented.  
T: “Well, now, I want you to consider me as a 
reader of the second kind, and to force me, 
logically, to accept Z as true." 
A: I'm to force you to accept Z, am I?" Achilles said 
musingly. "And your present position is that 
you accept A and B, but you don't accept the 
Hypothetical --”  
T: "Let's call it C," said the Tortoise.”  
A: "-- but you don't accept  
(C) If A and B are true, Z must be true.”  
T: "That is my present position," said the Tortoise.  
A: "Then I must ask you to accept C." [6] 
You can see where this is going. It is making the 
point that making the connection between properties 
A, B, and Z does not close the argument but logically 
must be considered as a proposition itself.  This is 
rather startling – especially to a theoretical physicist 
such as myself. It’s Zeno’s paradox applied to logic.  
The discussion clarifies the role of our “inner Achil-
les”. Even in formal proof our recognition software 
steps in to cut off the infinite chain. In other words, 
“Oh, I get it!” is NOT an element of formal logic. 
 This explains something that I’ve often seen in my 
classes. I will be doing a derivation on the board when 
some student asks, “How did you get that step?”  
Looking at it, it appears totally obvious to me. Look-
ing at it again, I realize that I have carried out a num-
ber of steps at once – multiplying by 2, moving some-
thing to the other side of the equation, etc., and that I 
could recognize that the two results were the same 
without thinking about it. To get my students to recog-
nize their equivalence I had to explicate a number of 
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steps. It becomes clear that these intuitive recognitions 
are cultural norms, learned as we become physicists. 
They play a role at different level than the formal, but 
they play a critical role even in interpreting the formal. 
Applying appropriate intuitions is not automatic, 
even for professionals. Consider the following. 
An Example from Problem Solving 
An interesting example is provided by a problem 
and solution from a recent (highly popular) calculus-
based physics text. Since the problem I am about to 
cite contains an error, I will not tell you what book it 
comes from. Every text contains errors, and I don’t 
mean to beat up on a particular author for missing 
something in the thousands of problems contained in a 
modern text. The problem is shown below. 
On a hot 35 C day, you perspire 1.0 kg of water 
during your workout. 
    (a) What volume is occupied by the evapo 
           rated water? 
     (b) By what factor is this larger than the    
           volume occupied by the liquid water? 
Fig. 1: A problem from a calculus-based  
introductory physics text. 
This seems quite strange. We know a lot about gases, 
in particular, that they expand to fill space. Is the an-
swer to (a), “it depends on the size of the room you are 
working out in”?  To see what they had in mind we 
look at the solution manual. To help students, the text 
suggests a rubric for approaching problem solving. 
Model! –Make simplifying assumptions. 
Visualize! – Draw a pictorial representation. 
Solve! – Do the math. 
Assess! – Check your result has the correct units,  
                is reasonable, and answers the question. 
This is good advice, isn’t it?  Here’s the solution in the 
manual. Note that it claims to follow the rubric. 
Model: –Assume the evaporated water is an ideal gas  
   with a molar mass of 18 g/mole. Assume the pres 
   sure is 1 atm = 101.3 kPa. 
Visualize: We are given  
T = 35 C + 273 = 308 K .   
n = 1000 g(1 mol/18 g)=55.6 mol.
 
Solve:    
   (a)       pV = nRT V = nRT
p
=
(55.6 mol)(8,31 J/mol K)(308 K)
101.3 kPa
= 1.4 m3
 
   (b) In the liquid state  = 1000 kg/m3  
   (a simple calculation yields a factor of 1400). 
Assess: Gases really do take up a lot more volume  
   than the equivalent mass of a liquid!  
Ouch!  The difficulty is that the answer in the solu-
tion manual fails to treat the problem intuitively – to 
tell the story of the problem. The steps of the rubric are 
gone through formally – but without the activation of a 
sense-making intuition about molecules – and even 
about the nature of gases.  
Tying the analysis to a rubric – a formal set of 
mapped rules (the armor) does not help if it does not 
also activate an intuitive sense of meaning by tying the 
problem to all we know and recognize about a system.  
Again, my point is not to chastise the authors of this 
particular problem but to point out that even profes-
sionals can produce nonsense if they mistake the ar-
mor for the inner Achilles. 
Intuition has many components: the identification 
of identity – to determine when things are supposed to 
represent the same thing (as in being able to follow 
formal proof); and the making of meaning – placing a 
problem in a broader context by linking to the many 
things we know about our subject and about the world. 
THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM THROUGH 
A SOCIO-CULTURAL LENS 
What I am calling intuition relies on our entire experi-
ence of the world, but it also involves strengthening 
our recognition software through professional knowl-
edge and experience. The intuition of a physicist does 
not belong to an individual alone, but arises as an 
emergent phenomenon from his or her interactions 
with others in the community of physicists and from 
the educational experiences we create for our students. 
This has powerful implications when we consider in-
terdisciplinary issues such as getting training for our 
majors from service departments such as math – or 
when we ourselves provide training for majors in other 
disciplines such as engineering or biology. 
Math in Physics 
If many of our critical hidden curricular elements 
are community driven, when we go to different com-
munities for service courses we can get something 
different from what we want. 
Here’s a problem from a calculus final exam at my 
university. 
The population density of trout in a stream is 
r(x) = 20
1+ x
x2 +1   
where r is measured in trout per mile and x is 
measured in miles. x runs from 0 to 10. 
(a) Write an expression for the total number of 
trout in the stream. Do not compute it. 
(b)… 
Fig. 2: A problem from a final exam  
in an introductory calculus class. 
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I suspect that most physicists will be troubled, as I am, 
by the lack of concern for units. Not only is the “20” a 
different kind of object than the “1”, but the “1” on top 
of the fraction and the “1” on the bottom are different 
kinds of objects! (One is a length, the other an area.)  
If one of my students wrote an expression like that on 
my exam, they would get a 0 for writing nonsense! 
A second problem is that of parameters. On the fi-
nal calculus exam I looked at, every problem had two 
symbols – an independent variable and a dependent 
one. All of the other glyphs on the exam were numbers 
or math symbols; there was not a single parameter. 
This avoidance of parameters is endemic in calculus. 
In a typical calculus text containing thousands of equa-
tions, you will find almost none containing parameters. 
Yet in physics, understanding parametric dependence 
– considering limiting cases, for example – is a critical 
skill. In a typical physics text, you will find few equa-
tions that do not contain numerous parameters. Our 
first equations in kinematics will contain half-a-dozen 
different letters – and confuse students terribly. 
My third example gets at the heart of the hidden 
ways that we use math differently in physics from the 
way mathematicians do. Do we ever need our students 
to be able to create an epsilon-delta proof?  In fact, I 
claim that in physics, the “derivative” is an approxima-
tion to a physical quantity that is not correctly de-
scribed by a limiting process. We consider a velocity, 
for example, as a ratio of small changes. If we try to 
make t too small, our x will start losing its smooth-
ness. We will see the bumps arising from the fibers on 
a wooden track, the vibrations due to Brownian mo-
tion, and eventually, the loss of definition of position 
at all due to quantum mechanics. I tell my students that 
when I write dx/dt the “d”s simply mean a  that is 
smaller than any scale I want to consider. 
These distinctions illustrate hidden differences be-
tween the epistemological assumptions the cultures of 
physics and math make in the use of equations. If we 
fail to be aware of these differences – and to commu-
nicate them clearly to our mathematical colleagues, 
they can cause our students considerable difficulties. 
Physics in Biology 
My math example shows how the mathematicians’ 
hidden epistemological assumptions about their nature 
of knowledge sometimes have conflicts with ours in 
ways that cause our students trouble. Similarly, when 
we provide service courses, we need to understand 
how students in other disciplines use what we teach. 
Many groups are now exploring how to better teach 
physics to biology students. Our traditional approach  
cuts down the course for engineers. But do biologists 
ever need to calculate projectile motions?  Why should 
we teach thermo using heat engines?  No biological 
organism makes its metabolism on temperature differ-
ences. Why do we essentially never mention chemical 
energy?   
Beyond the content, what most biologists do with 
physics is often very different from what physicists or 
engineers do with it. The “hidden curriculum 
epistemology” of physics as used in biology embeds 
the physics into highly complex webs of knowledge 
about biological systems. In physics, we tend to 
always go to the simplest example and to build 
intuitions about them, using those intuitions as the 
bones on which to put the flesh of more complex 
examples. This doesn’t work in biology where the 
physics acts more as constraints (energy conservation, 
second law of thermodynamics, charge conservation, 
…) and by describing functional parametric 
dependence that can be used by evolution in different 
way by different organisms. 
CONCLUSION 
We often look at student failures and try to fix them by 
creating linear algorithms – as if the students were 
computers to be programmed. This sometimes works – 
because the inner Achilles comes along for the ride. I 
conjecture that many of the excellent PER reforms 
(Tutorials, Group Problem Solving, Workshop Physics 
[7]) work because they give students free rein to de-
velop their inner Achilles. 
But if want to learn how to help our students in a 
variety of communities build an adaptive and flexible 
expertise, we are going to have to pay more explicit 
research attention to understanding and modeling in-
tuition development – from the intersection of a cogni-
tive and socio-cultural perspective.  
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